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A hand or something passes across the sun. Your eyeballs slacken,
you are free for a moment. Then it comes back: this
test of the capacity to keep in focus
this
unfair struggle with the forces of perception'
We as lawyers have been trained to desire abstract, universal, objective
solutions to social ills, in the form of legal rules or doctrine. Much of the
history of feminist 2 jurisprudence has reflected that tradition. It has been
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larly Dean Guido Calabresi, Associate Dean Jamienne Studley, and Ellen- Liebman. The text has
been expanded and footnotes added with the assistance of Jane Marx.
1. A. RICH, A Vision (Thinking of Simone Weil), in A WILD PATIENCE HAS TAKEN ME THIS
FAR 50 (1981).
2. I do not mean to confine "feminism" to a way of thinking available only to persons born
female. Rather, I refer to feminism as a method, as the critique of objectivity in epistemological,
psychological, and social-as well as legal-terms. Similarly, when I refer to "femaleness," "male-
ness," or ascribe "points of view" to either sex, I am relying on the premise that gender identity is a
complex, socially-determined phenomenon, a process (unavoidable to its subjects) of conscription into
rigid sex roles. Thus, the male and female "points of view" surely vary among individuals, but are
demonstrably "sex-linked" with respect to the rites of genderization.
Nor do I mean to suggest that feminism is a monolithic movement. I have no wish to underplay our
diversity; on the contrary, I welcome it. Our divergence in opinion, widely advertised as a weakness
by opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970's, has proved to be a source of great
strength. The debate over pornography, for example, is intense and seems far from resolution. Yet
that controversy has produced remarkable legal theories, see, e.g., MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2
YALE L. & POL'y REv. 321 (1984) (defending Indianapolis pornography ordinance in terms of fail-
ures of assumptions underlying First Amendment doctrine), revitalized debate about the First Amend-
ment (and hence, about the role of government); Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A
Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 130 (1985) (rehabilitating First Amend-
ment doctrine), and involved the courts in exactly the sort of public discourse which is vital to society.
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a debate, in the abstract, about appropriate rules. This essay uses the
work of several non-legal authors 3 to illustrate the impossibility of seeing
solutions to inequality through that lens of abstraction. This essay con-
cerns feminist efforts to live with, and ultimately to resist, abstraction it-
self. It is also an essay about the power of the way things are: how com-
fortably we respond in accord with our learned reticence; how easily we
leap for shallow solutions; and how such solutions are shifting shadows,
constantly testing our capacity to keep in focus, keeping us in fear of being
blinded by a brighter light.
WHERE WE'VE BEEN
In this country, the engine of the struggle for equality has been Aristo-
telian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike persons un-
like.4 Under this model, when legal distinctions are made, the responsible
sovereign must point to some difference between subjects which justifies
their disparate treatment.5 That was the model in Reed v. Reed,6 the first
equal protection case decided favorably in the Supreme Court for women.
Under the expert guidance of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU
Women's Rights Project, the Reed Court held that the state of Idaho
could not presumptively deny to women the right to administer estates.
With respect to such activities, the Court saw that women and men are
"similarly situated." That is, no demonstrable difference between the
sexes justified treating them differently.
7
This is what Professor Catharine MacKinnon has called "the differ-
ences approach,"" and it worked extraordinarily well for Ginsburg and
her legions. Indeed, all was going swimmingly until the Court had to face
situations where the sexes are not, or do not seem to be, similarly situ-
See American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indianapolis ordinance
defining pornography as subordination of women violates First Amendment), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1172
(1986).
3. Focusing primarily upon the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Carol Gilligan, Dorothy Dinner-
stein, and Adrienne Rich, I arrive at an endorsement of Catharine MacKinnon's radical feminist legal
theory. The use of Wittgenstein will surprise some, but is a necessary choice for me. Without prior
exposure to Wittgenstein, I would probably have been trapped by legal education into believing the
paeans to objectivity which are the target of my criticism.
4. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHics V(3), at 112-14 (D. Ross trans. 1925).
5. This is what Charles Frankel has called "basic equality." Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81
ETHics 191, 194-96 (1971). As Frankel points out, the fact that the sovereign must justify its actions
is an advance over Aristotelian formal equality, where any perceived difference produces difference in
treatment. "Basic equality" is ultimately unsatisfying, however, because the rule that reasons must
exist does not indicate how good those reasons have to be. Id.
6. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
7. Id.
8. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101 (1979) (emphasis
omitted).
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ated-situations involving pregnancy,9 situations involving the supposed
overpowering sexual allure which women present to men, 0 and situations
involving the historical absence of women.11 When the "differences ap-
proach" was applied in those cases, the plaintiffs lost. Aristotle would
have been thrilled.
Feminist legal scholars have devoted enormous energies to patching the
cracks in the differences approach. The debate has been, and continues to
be, arduous.12 Which differences between the sexes are or should be rele-
vant for legal purposes? How does one tell what the differences are? Does
it matter whether the differences are inherent or the result of upbringing?
Is it enough to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate stereotyped
differences? Or are there situations where differences are sufficiently
"real" and permanent to demand social accommodation?
In response to these questions, feminists have tried to describe for the
judiciary a theory of "special rights" for women which will "fit"' 3 the
discrete, non-stereotypical, "real" differences between the sexes.1 4 And
9. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from risks covered by state
employees' insurance plan does not constitute sex discrimination under equal protection clause). For a
fuller if not altogether convincing treatment of the pregnancy issue, see Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981) (arguing that the law provides no "special rights," but only
enforces the guarantee of equality, by taking pregnancy and breastfeeding explicitly into account).
10. For an analysis of how the image of "woman as temptress" excuses discrimination, see Aiken,
Differentiating Sexfrom Sex: The Male Irresistible Impulse, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357
(1984). Most illustrative of this phenomenon are Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (refusal
to hire female prison guards allowed under Title VII as bona fide occupational qualification), and
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (constitutionality of California's
statutory rape law sustained). The Court in Michael M. relied upon the asserted statutory purpose of
preventing pregnancy: Because only women can become pregnant, young males need an additional
incentive for responsibility, namely, the fear of prosecution. Id. at 473. The history of that 1850
statute suggests, however, that its real purpose was to preserve the chastity of young females. See
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's
RTs. L. REP. 175, 181 n.47 (1982).
11. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of exclusion of women
from draft registration). For the reverse side of this familiar coin, see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding Massachusetts veterans' preference for civil service positions).
12. I jumped into it wholeheartedly. See Scales, supra note 9. Some notable examples in this
debate are C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8; E. WoGAsT, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
(1980); Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 513 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treat-
ment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977); Williams, supra note 10; Note,
Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487 (1982).
13. The "fit" metaphor probably had its origin in Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949), and is usually presented in terms of the famous Venn
diagrams therein. Id. at 347. The "fit," of course, is an important elaboration upon the constitutional
requirement of functional justification as first articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCul-
lough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate, . . . and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, . . . are constitutional." Id. at 421.
14. The articles cited in note 12, for example, operate within the "equal rights/special rights"
arena (with the dramatic exception of MacKinnon). Feminist battled feminist over "equal rights"
versus "special rights" regarding a Montana statute which requires employers to grant maternity, but
not paternity, leave to employees. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1983) (formerly § 39-7-203
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here lies our mistake: We have let the debate become narrowed by ac-
cepting as correct those questions which seek to arrive at a definitive list
of differences. In so doing, we have adopted the vocabulary, as well as the
epistemology and political theory, of the law as it is.
When we try to arrive at a definitive list of differences, even in sophisti-
cated ways, we only encourage the law's tendency to act upon a frozen
slice of reality. In so doing, we participate in the underlying problem-the
objectification of women. Through our conscientious listing, we help to
define real gender issues out of existence. Our aim must be to affirm dif-
ferences as emergent and infinite. We must seek a legal system that works
and, at the same time, makes differences a cause for celebration, not
classification.
A new jurisprudence emerges as we cease to conduct the debate in pre-
scribed legalistic terms. The equal/special rights debate, for example, re-
flects the circularity of liberal legal thinking. The rights formula, de-
scribed in terms of constitutional fit, presumes a fixed reality of gender to
which law must conform. The problem of sexual inequality, however,
when understood as systematic domination, is not susceptible to that view.
Our past reliance on rights/rule structuring has been disappointing, 5 be-
cause we have been unable to see the solipsism of the male norm. Our
tendency as lawyers to seek comprehensive rules in accordance with that
norm is a dangerous learned reflex which defeats feminism's critique of
objectification.
THE TYRANNY OF OBJECTIVITY
[M]ale dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious sys-
tem of power in history . . . it is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its
point of view is the standard for point-of-viewlessness; its particular-
ity the meaning of universality. Its force is exercised as consent, its
(1981)). For a description of the legislative hearings, see Williams, supra note 10, at 194-95. The
statute was upheld on the ground that it put women and men on more equal terms. Miller-Wohl Co.
v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (D. Mont. 1981), appeal dismissed,
685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 692 P.2d
1243, 1254 (Mont. 1984).
15. For women, rules have historically been rather like the Maginot line. American constitutional
rules have delivered much less than expected, from the Nineteenth Amendment to the "intermediate
standard" of equal protection review. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (establishing
heightened "middle-tier" of scrutiny in gender discrimination actions); cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981) (exclusion of women from draft registration satisfies middle-tier, in spite of over-
whelming evidence in favor of inclusion). I will not rehash that history, because I wish to resist the
sense of obligation felt by many feminist legal writers to reinvent the wheel (just as I did, see Scales,
supra note 9, at 377-422). Our tendency to do that indulges the solipsism of the patriarchal legal
system. Because, by its standards, inequality is hard to perceive, we obligingly keep starting from
scratch to make it perceptible. Instead, we must challenge the "objective" standards which objectify us,
which make us invisible and our history unimportant.
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authority as participation, its supremacy as the paradigm of order,
its control as the definition of legitimacy."8
Underlying the Supreme Court's ruling in Reed v. Reed" was a per-
ception that sexism is a distortion of reality. Once the Court made this
discovery, it needed to transform its discovery into a legalistic code, to
construct an "objective" rule. And here lies the most difficult part of rule-
making in our system as it is-phrasing the rule so that people believe
that the rule is detached, so that it appears to transcend the results in
particular cases.18
The philosophical basis of such an approach is "abstract universal-
ity."" In order to apply a rule neutrally in future cases, one must discern
a priori what the differences and similarities among groups are. But be-
cause there are an infinite number of differences and similarities among
groups, one must also discern which differences are relevant. To make this
determination, one must first abstract the essential and universal similari-
ties among humans;2" one must have strict assumptions about human na-
ture as such. Without such an abstraction, there is no way to talk about
which differences in treatment are arbitrary and which are justified. Un-
derlying this approach is the correspondence theory of truth: The sover-
eign's judgments are valid only when they reflect objective facts.21 Thus,
somewhere in the nature of things there must be a list of sex differences
that matter and those that do not. Notice, however, that abstract univer-
sality by its own terms cannot arrive at such a list. It has no "bridge to
the concrete" 22 by which to ascertain the emerging and cultural qualities
which constitute difference.
With nothing above ground, abstract universality constructed a dark
tunnel to its tainted delusion. It made maleness the norm of what is
human, and did so sub rosa, all in the name of neutrality.23 By this sub-
16. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635, 638 (1983) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence]. This article was the sequel to MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MacKinnon, An Agenda for
Theory].
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
18. The quality of transcendence of results has been said to be the primary feature of neutrality in
constitutional adjudication. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 12 (1959).
19. Gould, The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy, in
WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A THEORY OF LIBERAION 5-6 (C. Gould & M. Wartofsky
eds. 1976).
20. Id. at 13.
21. For a fuller explanation of correspondence, see B. RussELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
126-30 (1959).
22. Gould, supra note 19, at 20.
23. The most striking example is Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 14-42 (1872) (holding 14th Amendment's privileges and immunities clause did not
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terranean system, the "relevant" differences have been and always will be
those which keep women in their place.2 Abstract universality is ideology,
pure and simple. It is a conception of the world which takes "the part for
the whole, the particular for the universal and essential, or the present for
the eternal."'25 With the allegedly anonymous picture of humanity reflect-
ing a picture males have painted of themselves, women are but male sub-
jectivity glorified, objectified, elevated to the status of reality. The values
of things "out there" are made to appear as if they were qualities of the
things themselves. So goes the process of objectification: the winner is he
who makes his world seem necessary.
28
Feminist analysis begins with the principle that objective reality is a
myth. It recognizes that patriarchal myths are projections of the male
psyche.2'7 The most pernicious of these myths is that the domination of
women is a natural right, a mere reflection of the biological family.2 8 The
entitle Myra Bradwell to bar membership):
[Tihe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, a woman's protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. . . .The paramount destiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things ....
24. The cataloguing of differences along the lines described in the text is most evident in the
pregnancy area, where the treatment of pregnancy demanded by women would impose an immediate
financial burden on men. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). That case
rejected a Title VII challenge to an employer's refusal to include pregnancy in its disability benefits
program. The Supreme Court stated: "Title VII's proscription on discrimination does not . . . re-
quire the employer to pay that incremental amount. The District Court was wrong in assuming, as it
did, that Title VII's ban on employment discrimination necessarily means that 'greater economic ben-
efit[s]' must be required to be paid to one sex or the other because of their differing roles in 'the
scheme of human existence.'" Id. at 139 n.17 (citations omitted).
The economic argument, however, papers over the higher stakes. If pregnancy were treated as those
petitioners demanded, women's roles in society would be very different; they would cease to lead a
bifurcated existence. Scales, supra note 9, at 387-88, 435-37. In terms of the present analysis, if
pregnancy were treated without reference to a male norm, women would cease to wear the most
important trappings of "the other."
25. Gould, supra note 19, at 21.
26. As MacKinnon puts it:
Combining, like any form of power, legitimation with force, male power extends beneath the
representation of reality to its construction: it makes women (as it were) and so verifies (makes
true) who women "are" in its view, simultaneously confirming its way of being and its vision
of truth. . . .Objectivity is the methodological stance of which objectification is the social
process. Sexual objectification is the primary process of subjection of women. It unites act with
word, construction with expression, perception with enforcement, myth with reality.
MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 16, at 539, 541.
27. Smith, The Sword and Shield of Perseus: Some Mythological Dimensions of the Law, 6 J.L.
& PSYCH IATRY 235, 239 (1983).
28. Id. at 240-41. Smith demonstrates that biology has always served as the link between the
"natural order" and the normative social order. He cites G.B.A. Coker, who in his study of primitive
legal systems stated that "almost every known legal concept began and ended with the family." G.
COKER, FAMILY PROPERTY AMONG THE YORUBAS (2d ed. 1966), cited in Smith, supra note 27, at
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patriarchal paradigm of the will of the father informs rationality at every
historical stage. Professor J.C. Smith points out how that paradigm, cen-
trally driven by a need to subjugate woman and all that is womanly, is
violently reflected in the myth of Perseus. Perseus was able to slay the
female monster Medusa, but only with the goddess Athena guiding his
hand. Whereas Medusa was the archetype of a free woman, Athena was
the patriarchal stereotype of women, reflecting male needs. Because
Athena was not of woman born, she was always for her father's side: She
was an avowed servant of patriarchy.29
With the advent of the Golden Age, Greek thinkers rejected the Olym-
pian ideal and embraced natural laws susceptible of mathematical formu-
lation. When all that irrationality gave way to objectivity, it would seem
that the Greeks could have begun to take equality seriously in civic life.
But they never did free their slaves or emancipate their women. Objectiv-
ity left them plenty of room for immoral discretion, and they chose a polit-
ical structure that ensured the survival of male privilege."0 With the
Olympian mythic structure displaced, however, privilege had to be justi-
fied some other way, for detached justification is the mechanism of domi-
nation. The master must be able to describe the relationship as good in
itself (as Olympian-decreed hierarchy seemed good), in order to get the
slave to exhibit the regularities being used to justify the relationship.31
That is the hegemonic method of patriarchy: its aims are united within a
social fabric by assimilating the subordinated classes into the dominant
one, and by allying those classes with it.3"
Plato and Aristotle were hegemonic heroes, not only for their own times
but as models for the future. Their declarations of woman as partial
man 3 have been the prototype for all neo-mythic justifications of domina-
tion, from Christianity to Freud, through social darwinism, and including
economic and scientific explanations of the social order.3 ' The narcotic
influence which objectivity has increasingly exerted over our minds makes
us ever less alert to the mythic structure around us.35
238 n.4.
29. Id. at 260-61.
30. Id. at 252-54.
31. Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Reality? A Survey of Issues, in BEYOND
DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 44-45 (C. Gould ed. 1984).
32. See A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI
181-82, 195-96, 246-50 (Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans. & eds. 1971) (discussing dominant groups in
general).
33. For a helpful synopsis of early theories about the nature of woman, see Whitbeck, Theories of
Sex Difference, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A THEORY OF LIBERATION 54 (C. Gould &
M. Wartofsky eds. 1976).
34. See Smith, supra note 27, at 255-60.
35. "While the myth has become secularized and framed in the language of scientific inquiry, it is
still a projection of the male psyche where 'nature' or the natural evolutionary process has been
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A legal system must attempt to assure fairness. Fairness must have ref-
erence to real human predicaments. Abstract universality is a convenient
device for some philosophical pursuits, or for any endeavor whose means
can stand without ends, but it is particularly unsuited for law. Law is,
after all, a social tool. It is only extrinsically important. Its actual value
depends upon its success in promoting that which is intrinsically valuable.
By inquiring into the mythic structure of objectivity, we see that abstract
universality explicitly contradicts the ideal of a "government of laws, not
men." Our task, therefore, is to construct a system which avoids solipsism,
which recognizes that the subjectivity of the law-maker is not the whole of
reality.
A CALL FOR VIGILANCE
It is imperative for jurisprudence to tap the power of the more radical
versions of feminism. An effective contemporary feminist critique must be
radical in the literal sense. It must go to the root of inequality. Without
extraordinary subterranean vigilance, the radical potential of feminism
will be undermined. Like other movements that presage revolutionary
change, feminism faces a constant threat of deradicalization.
In her popular book, In A Different Voice, 3  developmental psychologist
Carol Gilligan observed that little girls and little boys appear to grapple
with moral problems differently."7 Boys tend to make moral decisions in a
legalistic way: they presume that the autonomy of individuals is the para-
mount value, and then employ a rule-like mechanism to decide among the
"rights" of those individuals.3 Gilligan refers to this as the "ethic of
rights""9 or the "ethic of justice."40 Girls, on the other hand, seem to pro-
substituted for a heavenly creating father." Smith, supra note 27, at 245; see also Harding, supra
note 31, at 48.
36. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DInFaErr VOICE (1982).
37. Gilligan does not claim to be making generalizations about either sex or about the origins of
the differences observed. Id. at 2. Her book is about modes of problem-solving which happen in her
research to correspond, albeit incompletely, to gender categories. For us to worry about the lack of fit
between her observations and those gender groups is to fall back into the fallacy of the "equal rights/
special rights" debate. We must resist the pressure to decide, abstractly and irrevocably, what the
differences between the sexes might be. For present purposes, I would use Gilligan's results for two
working hypotheses. First, given what I have experienced as the expectations imposed upon growing
up female, I am always surprised to observe women who do not tend toward conformity to a simpli-
fied Gilligan-esque model. The same holds true for my experience with male decision-makers. Thus,
insofar as law reflects the "rights-based" part of that model, it would seem disproportionately to have
excluded women's point of view from participation in its creation and administration. Second, given
"objectivity" as the systemic criterion for the validity of decisions, the mode of reasoning associated
with femaleness does not and cannot count. Thus, more than mere incorporation of that "female"
voice is required.
38. Gilligan, supra note 36, at 25-51.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 174.
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ceed by the "ethic of care.""' They have as their goal the preservation of
the relationships involved in a given situation.42 Their reasoning looks like
equity: they expand the available universe of facts, rules, and relationships
in order to find a unique solution to each unique problem.43
Just as Gilligan's work has the potential to inspire us in historic
ways, 44 it could also become the Uncle Tom's Cabin of our century. Law-
yers are tempted to use Gilligan's work in a shallow way, to distill it into
a neat formula. Her thesis is memorable, handy, and easy to over-
simplify. Rightly or wrongly, many people feel that such an over-
simplified version comports with their experience of the sexes. Moreover,
generalizations taken from Gilligan provide accessible analogues to the
law/equity split, and to the ethical positions competing in any legal dis-
pute. All in all, Gilligan's work tempts one to suggest that the different
voices of women can somehow be grafted onto our right- and rule-based
legal system.45
One in a non-vigilant mode might be moved to think that we could have
a system which in the abstract satisfies all the competing considerations:
rules, rights, relationships, and equity. This is what I call the "incorpora-
tionist" view.46 Gilligan asserts that as a matter of personal moral devel-
opment, the ability to integrate the ethics of care with the ethics of rights
signals maturity.47 I think no one would disagree with such a goal in an
emotional realm. Emotional and cognitive maturity have, however, come
to mean very different things.48 In the majority culture, emotional matur-
ity does not count as knowledge. The ad hoc evaluations we must under-
41. Id. at 164.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Id.
44. It has already helped support some excellent work in the area of alternative dispute resolu-
tion. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Prob-
lem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 763 n.28 (1984) (Gilligan's theory supports argument that
problem-solving, as opposed to adversarial, negotiation is preferable).
45. See, e.g., Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUnKE L.J. 447, 484, 494-95 (urging that legal
system should open up to "the voices of women").
46. "Incorporationism" is the label I gave to the approach that I supported in 1981. See Scales
supra note 9, at 435. Though not identical to the view that I criticize here, my stance had the same
basic flaw-an obsession with what differences between men and women the law could, in the ab-
stract, take into account. Pregnancy and breastfeeding, I thought, had to be accounted for if the law
were to take a sufficiently broad view of equality: Equality requires that a woman not be forced to
choose between children and career, just as a man need not make that choice. I endorse my former
view thus far. I then believed also that only pregnancy and breastfeeding could be taken into account,
because those were the only two "objectively" determinable differences between the sexes. The law, I
believed, needed to steer completely clear of the "subjective" phenomenon of stereotyping. I now see
that limitation as unnecessarily reticent and guaranteed to achieve nothing, as many such liberal as-
sumptions are.
47. C. GILLGAN, supra note 36, at 151-74. Gilligan admits that the contours of such an integra-
tion are difficult to envision clearly, id. at 165, because the perspectives are "opposite truths," "two
different moral ideologies." Id. at 164.
48. E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENcE 84 (1985).
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take in the emotional realm cannot be acknowledged elsewhere. Such
judgments are not "reliable;" only "objectivity" is reliable. We should be
especially wary when we hear lawyers, addicted to cognitive objectivity as
they are, assert that women's voices have a place in the existing system. In
the words of James Agee: "Official acceptance is the one unmistakable
symptom that salvation is beaten again, and is the one surest sign of fatal
misunderstanding, and is the kiss of Judas."'49
Incorporationism presumes that we can whip the problem of social ine-
quality by adding yet another prong to the already multi-pronged legal
tests my students feel they must memorize. Incorporationism suffers from
the same lack of vision as the "equal rights/special rights" debate. Both
presume that male supremacy is simply a random collection of irrationali-
ties in an otherwise rational co-existence. Both presume that instances of
inequality are mere legal mistakes-a series of failures to treat equals as
equals which we can fix if we can just spot the irrationality in enough
cases. 50 As Professor MacKinnon has demonstrated, however, from such
viewpoints we cannot see that male supremacy is a complete social system
for the advantage of one sex over another.51 The injustice of sexism is not
irrationality; it is domination. Law must focus on the latter, and that fo-
cus cannot be achieved through a formal lens. Binding ourselves to rules
would help us only if sexism were a legal error.
A commitment to equality requires that we undertake to investigate the
genderization of the world, leaving nothing untouched. The principles of
objectivity, abstraction, and personal autonomy are at risk. In our search,
we must look for the deeper causes and consequences of Gilligan's find-
ings. Her work is empirical evidence for what feminist theory has already
postulated: A male point of view focuses narrowly on autonomy, on the
separation between self and others.52 That disjunction contains the roots
of domination. In the terms of feminist theory, male reality manifests itself
by negating that which is non-male. The male model defines self, and
other important concepts, by opposing the concept to a negativized
"other."53 Male rationality divides the world between all that is good and
49. J. AGEE & W. EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN 15 (1941). My colleague Karl
Johnson and I, in a required first year jurisprudence course, use these words to admonish caution in
our students as they begin their search for authority in law. For further description of (and discussion
with other scholars about) teaching jurisprudence in the first year, see Johnson & Scales, An Abso-
lutely, Positively True Stoy, 16 N.M.L. Rav. (forthcoming 1986).
50. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 102.
51. Id. at 121.
52. Gilligan would say, I think, that the typical development of the male pysche focuses first on
autonomy, and only later on relationships. See C. GILLGAN, supra note 36, at 160-64 (discussing
male psyche).
53. These ideas were first articulated in a feminist context by Simone de Beauvoir. S. DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEx (H. Parshley trans. 1952).
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all that is bad-between objective and subjective, light and shadow, man
and woman. For all of these dichotomies (and there are scores more), the
goodness of the good side is defined by what it is not.
Whereas the male self/other ontology seems to be oppositional, the fe-
male version seems to be relational." The female ontology is an alterna-
tive theory of differentiation that does not define by negation nor require a
"life and death struggle"' 5 to identify value in the world. Instead, it per-
ceives relationship as constitutive of the self. It perceives dichotomization
as irrational.
56
Male and female perceptions of value are not shared, and are perhaps
not even perceptible to each other.57 In our current genderized realm,
therefore, the "rights-based" and "care-based" ethics cannot be blended.
Patriarchal psychology sees value as differently distributed between men
and women: Men are rational, women are not. Feminist psychology sug-
gests different conceptions of value: Women are entirely rational, but soci-
ety cannot accommodate them because the male standard has defined into
oblivion any version of rationality but its own.58 Paradigmatic male val-
ues, like objectivity, are defined as exclusive, identified by their presumed
opposites. Those values cannot be content with multiplicity; they create
the other and then devour it. Objectivity ignores context; reason is the
opposite of emotion; rights preclude care. As long as the ruling ideology is
a function of this dichotomization, incorporationism threatens to be mere
co-optation, a more subtle version of female invisibility.
By trying to make everything too nice, incorporationism represses con-
tradictions. It usurps women's language in order to further define the
world in the male image; it thus deprives women of the power of nam-
ing.59 Incorporationism means to give over the world, because it means to
54. The term "self/other ontology" and the distinction between "relational" and "oppositional"
ontologies are taken from Whitbeck, A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology, in BEYOND DOmINA-
TION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 64 (C. Gould ed. 1984).
55. Id. at 69.
56. Id. at 76.
57. "My research suggests that men and women may speak different languages that they assume
are the same, using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships.
Because these languages share an overlapping moral vocabulary, they contain a propensity for system-
atic mistranslation . . . ." C. GILUGAN, supra note 36, at 173.
58. See Harding, supra note 31, at 52.
59. "Naming" is a critical concept to feminism. When we discover what we really think and
express it, we give words and the world new meaning. And when we call each other's names, we
affirm a core of our being as women that we are only now unlearning to devalue. But this feminist
"naming" should not be confused with nominalism nor with a reference theory of meaning. For us
"Naming' is a political term. "Naming" means rejecting the Adam myth that the world was made for
males to discern; it means reclaiming our own world and our own experiences. Virginia Woolf de-
scribes this process in A Room of One's Own. V. WooL.F, A RooM OF ONE'S OWN 31-38 (1957). She
describes how at first she was surprised at men's hatred toward women, then she became angry about
it, and then:
[B]y degrees fear and bitterness modified themselves into pity and toleration; and then in a
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say to those in power: "We will use your language and we will let you
interpret it."
There are words I cannot choose again:
humanism androgyny
Such words have no shame in them, no diffidence
before the raging stoic grandmothers:
their glint is too shallow, like a dye
that does not permeate
the fibers of actual life
as we live it, now . . . o
FEMINIST METHOD
To question everything. To remember what it has been forbidden
even to mention. To come together telling our stories, to look afresh
at, and then to describe for ourselves, the frescoes of the Ice Age, the
nudes of "high art," the Minoan seals and figurines, the moon-
landscape embossed with the booted print of a male foot, the micro-
scopic virus, the scarred and tortured body of the planet Earth. 1
Feminist thinking has evolved dramatically in the last twenty years,
from an essentially liberal attack on the absence of women in the public
world to a radical vision of the transformation of that world. 2 The de-
mand for "gender neutrality" which served valiantly in the legal struggles
of the seventies has inevitably become a critique of neutrality itself, which
year or two, pity and toleration went, and the greatest release of all came, which is freedom to
think of things in themselves. That building, for example, do I like it or not? Is that picture
beautiful or not? Is that in my opinion a good book or a bad? Indeed [having a room of my
own] unveiled the sky to me, and substituted for the large and imposing figure of a gentleman,
which Milton recommended for my perpetual adoration, a view of the open sky.
Id. at 39.
60. A. RICH, Natural Resources, in THE DREAm OF A COMMON LANGUAGE: POEMS 1974-1977,
at 66 (1978). As she puts the same sentiment in prose:
The urge to leap across feminism to "human liberation" is a tragic and dangerous mistake.
It deflects us from our real sources of vision, recycles us back into old definitions and struc-
tures, and continues to serve the purposes of patriarchy, which will use "women's lib," as it
contemptuously phrases it, only to buy more time for itself-as both capitalism and socialism
are now doing. Feminism is a criticism and subversion of all patriarchal thought and institu-
tions-not merely those currently seen as reactionary and tyrannical.
A. RICH, Toward a Woman-Centered University, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE SELECTED
PROSE 1966-1978, at 134 n.11 (1979) (emphasis in original).
61. A. RICH, Forward. On History, Illiteracy, Passivity, Violence, and Women's Culture, in ON
Li s, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELErTED PROsE 1966-1978, at 13-14 (1979).
62. For a demonstration of the feminist theoretical revolution in the context of the "hard" sci-
ences, see E. KELLmR, supra note 48, at 75-94.
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proceeds by an admittedly non-neutral method. Explanations of our
method usually provoke the charge of nominalism, such is the staying
power of the ideal of objectivity. Feminist method would appear to be an
easy target for that weapon. Feminism does not claim to be objective, be-
cause objectivity is the basis for inequality. Feminism is not abstract, be-
cause abstraction when institutionalized shields the status quo from cri-
tique. Feminism is result-oriented. It is vitally concerned with the oblivion
fostered by lawyers' belief that process is what matters.
The next step for theory is therefore to demonstrate that feminist
method leads to principled adjudication and a more orderly coexistence.
Let us begin by reconsidering Carol Gilligan's results. The little boys'
approach divides life into opposing camps. In a moral dilemma, this per-
son or that person shall win, based upon some "essential" difference in
their situations. One must be shown to be unworthy and wrong. One must
be transformed into the "other."
Perhaps there is something in the paradigm of male infant development
which teaches a harsh method of differentiation. Insofar as objectification
is taught as the preferred way to see the world, we replicate the emotional
substructure of domination. The children are thereby programmed, pre-
pared to fall into the habit of objectification which is at the heart of wo-
man-loathing. As adults, these people may have noble intentions, but it
will be too late. At best, they will become incorporationists-people who
must co-opt the voices of the powerless, who can't let them speak for
themselves because, by definition, "the other" is mute."3
Compare the problem-solving method used by the little girls. Their
habit of expanding the context, of following the connections among people
and events, is descriptive of rationality. When given a situation with
which to grapple, the girls do not insist upon uncovering an essence of the
problem, but look rather for a solution that is coherent with the rest of
experience.
If I am right that the "rights-based" and "care-based" approaches are
incompatible, we must make a choice between adjudicative principles. The
choice is not, however, between male and female hegemony. The choice is
rather between a compulsion to control reality and a commitment to re-
strain hegemony.64 Do we want a system that brooks no disagreement or
63. Dorothy Dinnerstein argues, for example, that the radical male's attempts to overcome op-
pression are inevitably abortive:
He is drawing strength from the subservience of woman for a struggle against the tyranny of
man; but he can keep woman subservient only with the strength he draws from the sponsor-
ship of the male tyrant.
D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR 196 (1977).
64. See E. KELLER, supra note 48, at 178 ("A healthy science is one that allows for the produc-
tive survival of diverse conceptions of mind and nature, and of correspondingly diverse strategies. In
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one that invites as many points of view as the varieties of existence re-
quire? The values of honesty and pragmatism require us to choose the
relational model, because only it describes how we as language-users actu-
ally and responsibly perform according to truly meaningful criteria.
5
Consider Wittgenstein's explanation of the concept of "games.""
6 It is a
concept we all use with great success, but what is its "essence?" There
isn't one.
[L]ook and see whether there is anything common to all [games].
For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to
all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.
To repeat: don't think, but look!
67
Investigation of the world is a matter of communication, and communica-
tion can never be made out of context. How we use any concept, whether
it be "game" or "domination," cannot depend on some universal essence.
By looking around, we have examples-we can grasp the concept. Then
we recognize other examples, not because they share any essence, but be-
cause of their relational matrix.
[W]e extend our concept. . . as in spinning a thread we twist fibre
on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact
that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the over-
lapping of many fibres.68
Law, like the language which is its medium, is a system of classifica-
tion. To characterize similarities and differences among situations is a key
step in legal judgments. That step, however, is not a mechanistic manipu-
my vision of science, it is not the taming of nature that is sought, but the taming of hegemony.").
65.
The well-regulated clock keeps good time and the well-drilled circus seal performs its tricks
flawlessly, yet we do not call them 'intelligent'. We reserve this title for the persons responsible
for their performances. To be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them; to
regulate one's actions and not merely to be well-regulated. . . . [A person] applies criteria in
performing critically, that is, in trying to get things right.
G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 28-29 (1963).
66. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-78, at 31-36 (G. Anscombe
trans. 3d ed. 1968). I do not mean to imply that I think of the process of legal justification as a game.
On the contrary, it is misleading when legal philosophers do, see, e.g., Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules,
64 PHIL REV. 3, 24-27 (1955) (comparing adjudication to baseball), because legal proceedings often
require us to question the rules themselves as well as what the rules mean. Wittgenstein's point, I
take it, is that when we use even a very familiar concept (like "games"), we are making a complex but
reliable judgment by means of criteria we cannot even articulate.
67. L. WITFGENSTEIN, supra note 66, § 66, at 31.
68. Id. § 67, at 32. It is fitting that, for this example and the next, Wittgenstein talks about
activities that are traditionally relegated to women: spinning thread and child tending.
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lation of essences. Rather, that step always has a moral crux. Consider
another Wittgensteinian example:
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them gam-
ing with dice, and the other says "I didn't mean that sort of game."
Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind
when he gave me the order?"9
Imagine this as a legal problem. Shall we indict Wittgenstein for cor-
rupting minors or not? Perhaps he simply made a mistake about what he
was supposed to do. It was just a lapse in communication. Or it could be
that Wittgenstein had the requisite intent; perhaps he is a lover of corrup-
tion. In the first case, shall we say that Wittgenstein was mistaken about
the essence of the command, or in the second, that he violated the essence
of the command? As the last sentence of the quote implies, the order-giver
didn't think about the possibility that Wittgenstein would choose dice
when the order was given. The essence of the thing does not exist. Our
decision does not depend upon whether "dice" falls within the statutory
term, nor upon any objectively determinable similarity or difference be-
tween this game and others. It depends upon a larger context which is not
neutral at all.
Law needs some theory of differentiation. Feminism, as a theory of dif-
ferentiation, is particularly well suited to it. Feminism brings law back to
its purpose-to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human situa-
tions. Law is a complex system of communication; its communicative ma-
trix is intended to give access to the moral crux. Finding the crux depends
upon the relation among things, not upon their opposition. In any case,
imperfect analogies are available; a case is similar or dissimilar to others
in an unlimited variety of ways. The scope and limits of any analogy must
be explored in each case, with social reality as our guide.70 This is a nor-
mative, but not illogical process. Any logic is a norm,71 and cannot be
used except with reference to its purposes. Why should that be so hard to
perceive, to teach, and to do?
Wittgenstein believed that his work with language was obvious, that he
was supplying "observations which no one has doubted, but which have
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes."172 It would
also seem obvious that relational reasoning is law's soul, that law's duty is
to enhance, rather than to ignore, the rich diversity of life. Yet this pur-
pose is not obvious; it is obscured by the myth of objectivity which opens
69. Id. at 33 (note without section number).
70. Whitbeck, supra note 54, at 75-76.
71. Harding, supra note 31, at 57.
72. L. WrrrGENS'rEIN, supra note 66, § 415, at 125.
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up law's destructive potential. Feminism inverts the logical primacy of
rule over facts. Feminist method stresses that the mechanisms of
law-language, rules, and categories-are all merely means for economy
in thought and communication. They make it possible for us to implement
justice without reinventing every wheel at every turn. But we must not let
means turn into ends. When those mechanisms obscure our vision of the
ends of law, they must be revised or ignored. Sometimes we must take the
long route in order to get to where we really need to be.
In feminist thought, deciding what differences are relevant for any pur-
pose does not require objectifying and destroying some "other." Feminism
rejects "abstract universality" in favor of "concrete universality." The for-
mer conjures differences-it elevates some to dispositive principles and de-
fines others out of existence-and makes maleness the norm. The latter
reinterprets differences in three crucial ways. First, concrete universalism
takes differences to be constitutive of the universal itself. Second, it sees
differences as systematically related to each other, and to other relations,
such as exploited and exploiter. Third, it regards differences as emergent,
as always changing7
3
In the past, two legal choices appeared to resolve claims of social injus-
tice: Law could either ignore differences, thereby risking needless con-
formity, or it could freeze differences, thereby creating a menu of justifica-
tions for inequality. Concrete universality eliminates the need for such a
choice. When our priority is to understand differences and to value multi-
plicity, we need only to discern between occasions of respect and occasions
of oppression. Those are judgments we know how to make, even without
a four-part test to tell us, for every future circumstance, what constitutes
domination.
Only let us understand what "inexact" means. For it does not mean
"unusable".74
One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred
edges.-"But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"-Is an indistinct
photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advan-
tage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indis-
tinct one often exactly what we need?
7 5
A precise picture of a fuzzy scene is a fuzzy picture. Domination comes in
many forms. Its mechanisms are so insidious and so powerful that we
could never codify its "essence." The description that uses no formula, but
which points to the moral crux of the matter, is exactly what we need.
73. Gould, supra note 19, at 27.
74. L. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 66, § 88, at 41.
75. L. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 66, § 71, at 34.
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PSYCHOANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS
The goal of discerning domination requires that the law recognize the
psychological substructures of gender. The legal system recoils from this
prescription on the ground that judgments about human development are
beyond its ken, that the law's point-of-viewlessness would be sullied by
such inquiries. This predictable response, however, is the reason for the
psychoanalytic inquiry in the first place. Feminist method discloses that
the law has "a personal investment . . . in impersonality.1" Psychoana-
lytic theory helps us to understand why the legal system has insisted upon
its lack of subjectivity and to analyze the subjectivity that so loudly denies
its presence. Though logically incoherent, the "I'm not here" position con-
forms to prior emotional experience; it is "stamped by the interpersonal
drama through which it was learned." 77 The insistence on objectivity in
law can best be seen as an excessive response to "the long and painful
process by which the child's sense of self is formed. "78 The demand for
objectivity is the cognitive counterpart to the individual's anxiety about
autonomy. Both objectivity and autonomy demand that an individual be
"severed from the outside world of other objects. . . and simultaneously
from [his] own subjectivity."M That severance is an act of violence 0 that
we must learn to control if we are to halt our species' ever more deter-
mined efforts to destroy itself.8 "
Feminist jurisprudence is unique in its demand for an adequate psy-
chology. Feminist jurisprudence goes beyond liberalism in requiring legal
decision-makers to reexamine any doctrine that is justified by an ethic of
individual autonomy. The liberal humanist goal of protecting the "un-
trammelled exercise of capacities central to human rationality" ' 2 not only
does not apply to disenabled persons, but often requires the systematic
deprivation of the freedom of others.8" In making the connection between
76. E. KELLER, supra note 48, at 10.
77. Id. at 71.
78. Id. at 80.
79. Id. at 70.
80. Id. at 91 n.6.
81. Dorothy Dinnerstein has most urgently drawn the connection between infant development and
self-destruction: "our steady growth toward a more open-eyed, foresightful awareness of [our] self-
creative process will have been the essence of our species' life while it lasted, the core of its impulse to
know itself and live itself out." D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at 12 n.*
82. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974). This liberal humanist rhetoric depends upon the oppositional self/
other ontology. As Richards makes clear:. "these liberties are fundamental conditions of the integrity
and competence of a person in mastering his life and expressing this mastery to others." Id. at 82.
83. As MacKinnon says regarding pornography: "To liberals, speech must never be sacrificed for
other social goals. But liberalism has never understood that the free speech of men silences the free
speech of women." MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 337 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 335-39
(challenging assumptions underlying First Amendment doctrine).
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domination and mechanisms of sex-role differentiation, feminism also goes
beyond Marxism. The latter sees domination as imposed by external eco-
nomic and political factors; feminism attends fully to the powerful oppres-
sive forces within us.8" The social experiences of the sexes are not the
same; a social theory without a convincing psychological account of that
differentiation cannot remedy gender inequality.
So, as Freud would say, what do women want? Though Freud was
miles away from seeing the significance of his question, he did contribute
an insight fundamental to feminism: Humans are not wholly rational ani-
mals. There are weird things going on in there. Our viewpoints are in-
formed by irrational, sometimes morbid patterns.
8 5 Feminism recognizes
within us that which Freud saw as irrational, and asserts, therefore, that
when dealing with social inequality there are no neutral principles. We
are dealing rather with the most pervasive implications of diseased uncon-
scious. But Feminism rejects what Dorothy Dinnerstein has shown to be
Freud's essentially conservative belief that our defects constitute a fixed
condition of the species' existence.8" Freud's conclusions about us are a
contingent rationalization, but his psychoanalytic model is an invaluable
description of the process of conscription into socially-determined sex-
roles. 
7
In one neo-Freudian account, Dinnerstein describes the process by
which infants become dependent upon, and then learn to loathe, women.
We are not Athene. We are woman-born, and almost without exception,
we are woman-nurtured in our infancy. It is to a woman we turn in our
helplessness; it is a woman who gives us our first grief when we discover
that she is imperfect and not always available; it is a woman who, by her
imperfection and her omnipotence, introduces us to existential angst.
Thus, Dinnerstein explains, our social arrangements reflect the necessity
of renouncing our first love while at the same time living out our anger at
her."'
The males of the species have been able to do this by dichotomizing the
world, by separating out man from woman, society from nature, enter-
84. MacKinnon, An Agenda For Theory, supra note 16, at 520. "To the extent that materialism
is scientific it posits and refers to a reality outside thought which it considers to have an objec-
tive-that is, truly nonsocially perspectival-content. Consciousness raising, by contrast, inquires into
an intrinsically social situation, into that mixture of thought and materiality which is women's sexual-
ity in the most generic sense." Id. at 543.
85. See N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MEANING OF HISTORY 1-10
(1959).
86. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at xii.
87. Rubin, The Traffic in Women, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL
ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS BETrWN WOMEN AND MEN 154 (A. Jaggar & P. Struhl eds. 1978).
88. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at 33-34, 91-114.
1390
Vol. 95: 1373, 1986
Feminist Jurisprudence
prise from homeyness, history from love."' By this process, we inherited a
society built around what Aldous Huxley called "organized loveless-
ness."90 The enterprise of making history is tinged with residual anger at
mother, and can be only a partial consolation for the loss of intimacy.91
The enterprise becomes a "compulsive concentration on what can be pre-
dicted, controlled, manipulated, possessed and preserved, piled up and
counted."91 2 As should be clear from that description, it is an enterprise
reflected, enhanced, and often directed by the legal system.
To this familiar account Dinnerstein adds an analysis of the symbiotic
nature of sexual pathology. She argues that both sexes, at least in their
stereotypical, genderized roles, have a stake in "keeping history mad." '98 A
woman acting in a genderized role-as nurturer, worrier, and la-
menter-may have no say in decisions of historical importance, but she
does get benefits: she gains the approval of those who are powerful, and,
of course, she does not have to take responsibility for making ugly histori-
cal decisions.9 A man acting in a genderized role-as warrior, as history-
maker, and as keeper of woman-avoids moral responsibility for his ac-
tions and need not admit the ugliness of aggressive behavior. He has
women there to ventilate the difficult emotions. Women do the weeping
for the world, while the mad megamachine rolls on.95
Dinnerstein reveals something crucial about incorporationism: In its
simplistic view of the alternative ontologies, incorporationism perpetuates
a destructive symbiosis. The rights-based side of things, for all its grand
abstraction, describes a pretty grim view of life on the planet. It treats
individuals in society as isolated monads, as natural adversaries who must
each stake out his own territory and protect it with the sword/shield
mechanisms called "rights." This model of aggression is half of what is
required for holocaust. False glorification of the "care-based" ethic sup-
plies the other side of the suicidal equation, because a death march re-
quires willing-looking victims. The incorporationist version of the care-
based ethic celebrates oblivion. Its Disney-movie appeal diverts attention
from the issue of powerlessness, and, indeed, makes a political virtue of it.
Masters glorify the contentment of their slaves, empires of their colonies.
Here, hegemony strikes again. An incorporationist legal regime would, at
89. See id. at 129-30.
90. A. HUXLEY, THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY 93 (1944).
91. See D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at 190.
92. Id. at 135.
93. Id. at 225-28.
94. Id. at 211-14. As Dinnerstein acknowledges, Simone de Beauvoir thoroughly explored this
theme of female cowardice in the context of existentialist ethics in The Second Sex. Id. (referring to S.
DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 53).
95. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at 214-24.
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best, merely institutionalize a familiar female critique-steady but
ineffectual."'
Dinnerstein's theory flounders, is itself incorporationist, because she
looks at the role of women from a patriarchally sanctioned place. She
presupposes the ontology which also served Freud so well: the opposition
of self and other, the "either/or 'investment' of libidinal energy."
7 Din-
nerstein suggests, for example, that patriarchy is possible because, to in-
fants, male authority is an attractive refuge from female authority. "For
this reason he is perceived from the beginning ... as a more human
being than the mother, more like an adult version of oneself, less en-
gulfing, less nebulously overwhelming."
' 8 Dinnerstein argues that, as long
as women are responsible for infant care, the need to possess and then
reject the "dirty goddess"'" is an inevitable feature of (male) infant psy-
chology.100 It seems just as reasonable, however, to view the advent of
adult male authority as a set-up. If it's true that daddy looks good com-
pared to mommy, that's a function of the awful way mommy is made to
look-irrational, powerless, ingratiating.
Being on the bottom of a hierarchy is not a pose, it is not a choice,
there is nothing safe about it, and it only looks brave and defiant to
those for whom its choicelessness and violation and dead-ended
chances look romantic and elevated because they are not real.
101
What the Freudians describe is a life and death struggle in infancy, a
necessary choosing of sides resulting in sex roles and arrangements. But
that conclusion could represent just another way to avoid facing how
power is used and abused. The Oedipus and Electra complexes which
"explain" the struggle are just as implausible as they always sounded.
102
As contemporary critics are suggesting, those theories may be suspect cre-
96. Id. at 225-27.
97. Whitbeek, supra note 54, at 72.
98. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 63, at 175 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 127-34.
100. This analysis leads Dinnerstein to prescribe complete co-responsibility for infant care. Id. at
155. Even in those ever numerically diminishing nuclear families where such a solution would be
possible, it is simply not enough. As long as differentiation is a violent concept, it seems that with co-
responsibility, daddy would also take on that terrible, mystical quality, and we could learn to loathe
both parents equally.
101. MacKinnon, Reply to Miller, Acker and Barry, Johnson, West, and Gardiner, 10 SIGNS
184, 187 (1984).
102. Dinnerstein suggests, for example, that the intimate experience with mother gives rise to a
later need in males for exclusive access to a woman. A similar need does not arise in females, however,
because female children are themselves internally possessed of that magical quality which made
mommy so wonderful in the first place. D. DINNERsTrEIN, supra note 63, at 41-43. As Adrienne Rich
points out, such an explanation has a rather mystical (and in her view, sinister) ring to it. Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE PoLrrcs OF SEx-
UALrrY 177, 182-83 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983).
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ations of Freud's imagination. 10 3 Perhaps those ideas were the result of
Freud's own inability to deal with the reality of domination: consistent
reports from his female patients of sexual molestation.'" Feminism re-
quires the law to question the inevitability of sex differentiation,"0 5 and to
be ever conscious of its role in enforcing female loyalty to men. 0 6 We
must look for that which we have been trained not to see. We must iden-
tify the invisible, and take responsibility for the violence built into the
genderized world.
It is insane at the end of the twentieth century to adhere to the belief
that people are innately horrid and can not do better. Rather, we must
recognize that our fears-of contingency,107 of dependency, 08 of unimpor-
tance1 9-have put us on a suicidal path. We need now to embrace the
lesson of Darwin-that we are a self-creating species. The life and death
struggle is now. This is the moment in history when guidance is most
needed. Unless the law awakens from its nineteenth century slumber, it
condemns itself, at best, to utter irrelevance and, at worst, to complicity in
destruction.
COPING WITH EQUALITY
The problem of inequality of the sexes stands in complex relation to the
problem of survival. Inequality in the sexual division of labor assures rep-
lication of the model of aggression. Pathological aggression accounts for
inequality. If these connections are ever to be unpacked, if we are serious
103. Those suggestions became a heated public controversy with the publication of J. MASSON,
THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY (1984).
104. For a concise account of Freud's rejection of the seduction theory in favor of the Oedipus
complex, see Smith, Gods and Goddesses of the Quadrant: Some Further Thoughts on the Mythologi-
cal Dimensions of the Law, 7 J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 219, 222-24 (1985).
105. As Adrienne Rich insists, feminist developmental psychology must ask new questions. Why
doesn't the infantile search lead both sexes to women? Why should women ever redirect their search?
Why are emotional/erotic relationships so rigidly identified? Why have violent strictures been neces-
sary to keep women in line? Rich, supra note 102, at 182-83.
106. J.C. Smith has produced a helpful list of historical practices, many of which are legally
sanctioned, which have evinced the basic psychoanalytic hate-and-control attitude towards women.
Smith, supra note 27, at 246-49.
107. See, e.g., J. LACAN, ECRrrs: A SE.aCTION (A. Sheridan trans. 1977) (describing how males
overcome fear of contingency by imposition of "phallocentric" order on world).
108. For the legal repercussions of a psychology of dependency (as opposed to a psychology of
aggression), see Smith, supra note 27, at 241-42.
109. Virginia Woolf speaks of the fear of unimportance in a typically disarming way:
Life for both sexes-and I looked at them, shouldering their way along the pavement-is
arduous, difficult, a perpetual struggle. It calls for gigantic courage and strength. More than
anything, perhaps, creatures of illusion as we are, it calls for confidence in oneself. . . . And
how can we generate this imponderable quality, which is yet so invaluable, most quickly? By
thinking that other people are inferior to oneself. . . . Women have served all these centuries
as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at
twice its natural size. Without that power probably the earth would still be swamp and jungle.
V. WOOLF, supra note 59, at 35.
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about survival, we need a radically more serious approach to equality.
Law must embrace a version of equality that focuses on the real is-
sues-domination, disadvantage and disempowerment-instead of on the
interminable and diseased issue of differences between the sexes. I endorse
the definition of equality proposed by Professor MacKinnon in 1979: The
test in any challenge'10 should be "whether the policy or practice in ques-
tion integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a de-
prived position because of gender status."'"" MacKinnon contrasts this to
the "differences approach," calling it the "inequality approach.""
2 I
would call the former "thinking like a lawyer;" the latter, "thinking like a
person."
That is not to say that the proposed standard will be easy to implement.
It will require us to bring the very best of our humanness to bear. That is
a scary proposition. No data yet exist to reassure us on the standard's
reliability, and, by its own terms, results cannot be predicted without the
compilation of records very different from those underlying previously de-
cided cases. The critics appropriately worry, for example, that classifica-
tions designed to address the real problems of women (such as pregnancy
legislation) will serve to reinforce stereotypes about women's place."' The
problem for feminist legal scholars, I think, is that we are unsure how to
measure what about stereotyping is at issue in a given case. The notion of
stereotyping connotes over-simplification, inattention to individual charac-
teristics, lack of seriousness, and invariance. We use the concept of stere-
otyping without difficulty when the challenged practice is based upon an
untrue generalization. All of the connotations of stereotyping are clearly
implicated in negative ways. In such cases, both the differences approach
and the inequality approach would prohibit the classification.
The inequality approach focuses upon two other sources of feminist dis-
comfort: first, the need for a reliable approach to generalizations which
are largely true (either because of biology or because of highly successful
socialization); and second, the need to distinguish between beneficial and
burdensome legislation.
Only the inequality approach attempts to reckon with true generaliza-
tions. Indeed, in that view, different treatment based upon unique physi-
cal characteristics would be "among thefirst to trigger suspicion and scru-
110. The standard proposed would apply both to challenges under the equal protection clause and
those pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). The examples
referred to in this section, therefore, draw from both contexts.
111. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 117. Nearly identical standards could be applied to other
historically disadvantaged groups.
112. Id. at 102.
113. See Williams, supra note 10, at 197-200; Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686,
1682-93 (1980) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, supra note 8).
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tiny."11 In the past, biological differences have been used to show that
classifications are not sex-based. " 5 Thereby, the reasons for having an-
tidiscrimination laws have been seen as the reasons to allow discrimina-
tion. " ' The inequality approach unravels the tautology. It makes no sense
to say that equality is guaranteed only when the sexes are already equal.
The issue is not freedom to be treated without regard to sex; the issue is
freedom from systematic subordination because of sex.'1 7
The inequality approach would also reach stereotypes which, though
not biologically based, have largely made themselves true through a his-
tory of inequality." 8 Consider the situation in Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp.,'9 where the company hired males with preschool age chil-
dren, but would not hire women in that category. As a variation, suppose
the trial court had found that women with small children did in fact have
greater responsibilities, and therefore were, as a group, less well suited for
the jobs in question. Such a finding would correspond to the facts of allo-
cation of child-raising responsibility.' 2" The only challenge that will work
in this scenario is one from an "exceptional" woman candidate for em-
ployment-a woman with preschool aged children whose job performance
will not be impaired by her obligations to them. 21 The policy will be
deemed irrational as applied to her.
Compare the inequality approach, which is triggered not by irrational-
ity, but by disadvantage. In our scenario, the inequality approach is supe-
rior because it reaches the worse injustice: The fact that women who fit
the stereotype are precluded from advancement in our economic system- A
challenge adjudicated by that standard would succeed on behalf of the
unexceptional as well as the exceptional. Employers (and other employees
114. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 118 (emphasis in original).
115. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding
statutory rape law that presumes male is culpable aggressor because "consequences of sexual inter-
course and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male"); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (disability insurance system did not "exclude anyone from benefit eligibil-
ity because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of com-
pensable disabilities").
116. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 227.
117. See id. at 117.
118. See id. at 122-25.
119. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (reversing court of appeals' determination that policy was
not sex-based). I am indebted to Professor MacKinnon for the example. C. MAcKINNON, supra note
8, at 225-26.
120. The Supreme Court in Phillips did suggest that, on remand, it might be determined that
maleness was a bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII. 400 U.S. at 544.
121. If the policy were found not to fall within the narrow ambit of the bona fide occupational
qualification (bfoq) exception under § 703(e) of Title VII, the company might be forced to apply the
criterion sex-neutrally (i.e., both men and women with young children may have the jobs). Then,
however, women would still be disproportionately disadvantaged because of the age-old double bur-
den. If the plaintiff challenged the policy on grounds of disproportionate impact, it may be justified as
a "business necessity." See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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who have carried a disproportionately lower burden in child-rearing)
would then essentially have to compensate for the benefits they have de-
rived from women's double burden. Such payment should include dam-
ages, and court-ordered advancement, day care, parents' leave, and reallo-
cation of workers' hours and rewards.122 This redistribution of historical
burdens and benefits may seem a sweeping remedy, but it is the only one
which addresses the reality.1"'
With respect to our second problem, the discernment of genuinely bene-
ficial classifications, suppose that the same company offered a hiring pref-
erence for women with school age children, and provided some relief from
the double burden. The offer undoubtedly "reinforces a stereotype," but
what shall we make of the fact that the stereotype is in large part-if only
contingently and temporarily-true? But true only because women carry
a disproportionate burden of the child-caring responsibility in our society.
Especially when women can elect to receive the benefits (as opposed to
risking stigmatization by them), what is the objection to such a plan? Dis-
advantage has a way of replicating and reinforcing itself. To oppose the
scheme is to be reduced to relying upon a groundswell of exceptional be-
haviors within the disadvantaged group itself. Historically, however, dis-
advantaged groups have been forced to rely upon surrogates to better
themselves. 2 That has not required that the groups thus assisted conform
for all time to the surrogates' perceptions of them (or even to their own
perceptions of themselves).
Beneficial classifications, therefore, seem necessary to the ultimate un-
doing of stubborn stereotypes. It is true that in our history, stereotypical
differences, both real and imagined, have served primarily as convenient,
"natural" justifications for imposition of burdens. It does not follow, how-
ever, that we cannot use differences progressively. Injustice does not flow
directly from recognizing differences; injustice results when those differ-
ences are transformed into social and economic deprivation.1 25 Our task
then, is to exercise our capacity for discernment in more precise ways.
Allegedly beneficial classifications, even when they invoke a stereotype,
must be measured against what is objectionable in stereotyping. Beneficial
classifications, such as the employment preference in our example, will
survive under the inequality approach if they do not have those character-
122. For a discussion of reforms needed by women in the workplace, see Scales, supra note 9, at
437-42.
123. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 122-27.
124. Ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, for example, could not have been accomplished
without surrogate action. One might plausibly surmise that ratification proceeded from the (partially
true) stereotype that women were loyal to men and would not use the vote in ways destructive to male
power.
125. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 105, 117-18.
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istics. Insofar as the employment preference over-simplifies, it is an over-
simplification in the service of a profound complexity, as is any well-
drafted policy. The preference provides to individuals the opportunity to
demonstrate their capacities when the stereotype is set aside. It evinces
laudable seriousness toward the problem, especially insofar as the stereo-
typer takes upon itself some of the burden of the past discrimination. Last,
and perhaps most important, it is not invariant. By definition it points to
the stereotype for the purpose of undoing it, as an example of how revised
present arrangements can relieve centuries of disadvantage. When alleg-
edly beneficial classifications do not have this form, 26 or when once bene-
ficial schemes cease to have it, the inequality approach would prohibit
them.
Admittedly, the inequality approach would sometimes require that dif-
ferent standards be used for men and women. 127 If that were not so, how-
ever, the approach would not be working. Its emphasis is upon enforced
inferiority, not sex-differentiated treatment.12 When the aim is to dis-
cover the reality of domination, the standard to be applied depends upon
the context. The inequality approach requires an investigation which
must delve as deeply as circumstances demand into whether the chal-
lenged policy or practice exploits gender status. To worry in the abstract
about which standard should be applied at what time is to replicate the
fallacy of the differences approach.
In short, the inequality approach means that we have to think more
broadly about what we want "equality" to mean. The traditional bases
for differentiation between the sexes are socially-created categories, given
meaning only by assigned biases. We create the relevant comparisons, and
are free to do so de novo in light of social realities. Thus, in the preferen-
tial hiring situation, we would say that the right at stake, rather than the
right to be treated without regard to sex, is the right not to have one's
existence bifurcated because of sex. In the pregnancy situation, it is the
right to have one's total health needs taken as seriously as are those of the
other sex.
1 29
126. Professor Taub criticizes MacKinnon for a lack of clarity about Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Super. Ct., 453 U.S. 57 (1981), suggesting that MacKinnon does not really have a position on
how that case should have come out. Taub, supra note 113, at 1691. Unless I am mistaken about the
inequality approach, however, it would surely condemn the California statutory rape provision. The
statute could not be seen as "an attempt to offer special protection to prevent women's continued
oppression," id., because the reality is that such statutes are designed, first, to render females incapa-
ble of consent (thereby institutionalizing their non-personhood), and second, to preserve the chastity of
females (thereby preventing property damage). See generally Williams, supra note 10, at 182-88
(discussing cultural bias underlying adoption of statutory rape laws); Aiken, supra note 10, at 373-75
(portraying statutory rape laws as means to enforce women's fear of male sexuality).
127. See Taub, supra note 113, at 1690-91.
128. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 115.
129. To redefine equality in the way suggested is "to treat women as equals by respecting the
1397
The Yale Law Journal
Logic is no obstacle to the implementation of the inequality approach.
The obstacles are, rather, perception and commitment. When the fact of
judicial manipulation has been so salient in the past, why should we now
expect those responsible for implementing the law to be able to see, in any
given situation, how women have been disadvantaged? 30 Accustomed as
judges are to looking for similarities and differences, they can not or will
not make the assessments of deprivation and disempowerment.
My response to this, on optimistic days, is that we are more persuasive
than we believe we are. If judges are supposed to accept guidance, we as
practitioners and scholars ought to be able to provide it. There has been
some progress, however modest.""' Our duty is to be vigilant in assuring
that what happens is real progress, and to guide the courts through our
proposed transformation of adjudication. Four members of the current Su-
preme Court, for example, seem prepared to listen to a well-reasoned al-
ternative to the plethora of superstructure which plagues constitutional
law.'3 The entire Court cries for guidance as to what differences among
us mean."" I believe we are up to the task.
At less optimistic moments, candor would compel me to admit that im-
plementation of a feminist approach will ultimately depend upon signifi-
cant changes in judicial personnel. Given what we have experienced, how-
ever, I feel comfortable with such an admission. It is time that feminist
lawyers spoke openly about the politics of neutrality, instead of pretending
that sexism were a legal mistake. We have, for example, squandered over
a decade discussing what legal standard could have prevented the outrage
of Geduldig v. Aiello.' But let's face it-the problem in that "analysis"
female gender and by ceasing to impose upon women a bifurcated existence; it is . . . to restore to
women the opportunity to live a continuous life, integrated with respect to career and procreation just
as are the lives of men." Scales, supra note 9, at 435.
130. See Taub, supra note 113, at 1690-91; Williams, supra note 10, at 196.
131. Taub cites Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), as an example of the Court's inability
to see disadvantage to women. Taub, supra note 113, at 1691. In that case, the Court invalidated a
social security benefits provision which disadvantaged the survivors of female workers. Only a plural-
ity saw the scheme as discriminatory toward women. Since that time, however, a majority seems to
have become adept at recognizing such discrimination against deceased workers. See Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (workers' compensation laws denying widower benefits
on his wife's work-related death that are available to widows violates equal protection clause).
132. See the concurrence of Justice Stevens (joined by Burger), and the partial concurrence of
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct.
3249 (1985) (zoning ordinance violative of equal protection clause as applied to prohibition of group
home for mentally retarded).
133. Id. The Cleburne plurality seems to hold that in order for classification to command higher
scrutiny, the petitioners must first show that the classification at issue can never be justified. 105 S.
Ct. at 3255. Thus, the irrelevance of a classification must be demonstrated before the classification can
be shown to be irrelevant. Thus, the Supreme Court has illustrated the truth in MacKinnon's reduc-
io ad absurdum treatment of the differences approach: In order to achieve equality you must first be
equal. As unfortunate as it may be, the Cleburne state of affairs smacks to me more of confusion than
ideology.
134. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). As Sylvia Law aptly puts it, criticizing Geduldig has become "a cot-
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(that no discrimination exists if pregnant women and pregnant men are
treated the same) is not that the Supreme Court used the wrong legal
standard. The problem was much more serious: It was that our highest
court cavalierly allowed California to disadvantage women with respect to
their reproductive capabilities. Our highest court endorsed a modern ver-
sion of a centuries-old method of domination.
We must never forget Geduldig. Our Supreme Court got away with it
because we allowed the question of pregnancy to be sequestered in our
own minds from the question of domination. In our search for a liberal
resolution, the real issue remained invisible, and our critique came dan-
gerously close to consent. Our objections can no longer be oblique, for
then they are lost. Keeping dissent hidden is an ancient tactic which ren-
ders the dissent trivial, abnormal, and disconnected from its roots. Due to
the distribution of women in society, this has particularly been the, case
with feminism. Because each new feminist work or insight appears as if
from nowhere, "each contemporary feminist theorist [is] attacked or dis-
missed ad feminam, as if her politics were simply an outburst of personal
bitterness or rage." ' 5 Trust we must have that we can describe the issues;
empowered we must be when our trust is violated.
The proposed inequality standard will not take root overnight. Devel-
opments in feminist theory take decades to manifest themselves in law.136
But it will happen; the difficulty of the process must not stop us from
demanding that change, or from continuing the tradition that makes it
possible.
FEMINIST METHOD REVISITED
The term "feminist jurisprudence" disturbs people. That is not surpris-
ing, given patriarchy's convenient habit of labeling as unreliable any ap-
proach that admits to be interested, and particularly given the historic a
tage industry." Law, supra note 13, at 983 & n.107 (citing more than two dozen articles critical of
decision).
135. A. RICH, supra note 61, at 11. Similarly, Virginia Woolf argued: "[Masterpieces are not
single and solitary births; they are the outcome of many years of thinking in common, or thinking by
the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the single voice." V. WOOLF,
supra note 60, at 68-69. Woolf believed that the lack of recoverable tradition behind nineteenth
century women writers was the single greatest obstacle they faced. Id. at 79.
136. An example is American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
affld, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986). In the opinion invalidating the Indianapolis pornography ordinance,
the Seventh Circuit carries on a rhetorical (and usually unfair) discussion with Catharine MacKin-
non, one of the drafters of the ordinance. Id. at 325, 328-30 (citing MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985)). The Seventh Circuit even accepts the
premises of the legislation. 771 F. 2d at 329. From a broader perspective, however, the feminist
critique of liberal assumptions about the nature of "freedom" has existed in principle since the publi-
cation of The Second Sex in 1952, S. DE BEAuvom, supra note 53, and explicitly since the publica-
tion The Dialectic of Sex in 1970, S. FRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970).
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priori invalidation of women's experience. That longstanding invalidation
also causes women, including feminist women, to be reluctant to make any
claims beyond the formal reach of liberalism. Further, we are taught to
ascribe the legal system's successes to the principle of detachment.
In the understandable rush to render feminism acceptable in traditional
terms, it is sometimes suggested that we ought to advertise our insight as a
revival of the Legal Realism of the 1930's.137 We are surely indebted to
the Realists for their convincing demonstration that the law could not be
described, as the positivists had hoped, as a scientific enterprise, devoid of
moral or political content. The Realists' description of the influence of
morality, economics, and politics upon law is the first step in developing
an antidote for legal solipsism. In the end, however, the Realists did not
revolutionize the law but merely expanded the concept of legal process.
138
The Realists did not press their critique deeply enough; they did not bring
home its implications. In the face of their failure, the system has clung
even more desperately to objectivity and neutrality. "[T]he effect of the
Realists was much like the role that Carlyle pronounced for Matthew
Arnold: 'He led them into the wilderness and left them there.' "139
Feminism now faces the charge leveled at Realism, that it destroys the
citadel of objectivity and leaves nothing to legitimate the law. Our re-
sponse to this state of affairs begins with an insight not exclusive to femi-
nist thought: The law must finally enter the twentieth century. The busi-
ness of living and progressing within our disciplines requires that we give
up on "objective" verification at various critical moments, such as when
we rely upon gravity, 140 or upon the existence of others,141 or upon the
137. It is important to cultivate these analogies, especially insofar as there are lawyers out there
who wonder what ever happened to legal realism and are dissatisfied with Critical Legal Studies as a
successor. To explore where feminism differs from realism (and for that matter, from CLS) is a way
to get at the most elusive and crucial aspects of the theory.
138. See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 812 (1935):
When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are thought of as reasons
for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached on
other grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or argument, is apt to
forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be
judged. Thus it is that the most intelligent judges in America can deal with a concrete practical
problem of procedural law and corporate responsibility without any appreciation of the eco-
nomic, social, and ethical issues which it involves.
See also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 87 (1977) (arguing that the realist "revolution
may have been merely a palace revolution, not much more than a changing of the guard.").
139. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1950s TO THE
1980s, at 156 (1983).
140. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 108 (2d ed. 1970) (abandon-
ment by eighteenth-century scientists of attempt to explain gravity reflected "neither a decline nor a
raising of standards, but . . . the adoption of a new paradigm").
141. See L. WrirGENSTEIN, supra note 66. One of the favorite targets of Wittgenstein's war on
philosophical muddles was metaphysical solipsism, which maintains that the self of the thinker is the
whole of reality; the external world and other persons have no independent existence. This argument
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principle of verification itself. Feminism insists upon epistemological and
psychological sophistication in law: Jurisprudence will forever be stuck in
a post-realist battle of subjectivities, with all the discomfort that has repre-
sented, until we confront the distinction between knowing subject and
known object.
Feminist method is exemplary of that confrontation. The physics of rel-
ativity and quantum mechanics demonstrate that nature is on our side:
Nature itself has begun to evince a less hierarchical structure, a mul-
tidirectional flow of authority which corroborates our description of per-
ception.1" 2 We warmly embrace the uncertainty inherent in that percep-
tual model, recognizing the humanity, and indeed, the security, in it.' 3
And because we do not separate the observer from the observed,
"[f]eminism is the first theory to emerge from those whose interest it af-
firms."' 14 ' Feminist method proceeds through consciousness raising. The
results of consciousness raising cannot be verified by traditional methods,
nor need they be." 5 We are therefore operating from within an epistemo-
logical framework which denies our power to know. This is an inherently
transformative process: It validates the experience of women, the major
content of which has been invalidation.1 6
Feminism criticizes this male totality without an account of our ca-
pacity to do so or to imagine or realize a more whole truth. Femi-
commonly asserts that I cannot be certain of your existence because I cannot experience your sensa-
tions; I cannot, for example, "know" your "pain." Beginning from the perspective of how people
actually use language, Wittgenstein demonstrated that such an assertion merely evinces confusion
about the grammar of the word "know" (id. § 246, at 89) and the word "pain" (id. §§ 293, 303, 384,
at 100, 102, 118). Thus, it makes sense to say "I feel my pain," or "I know your pain" (id. § 246, at
89), but to maintain that I know my pain and don't know yours makes no more sense than to say,
"Someone is in pain-I don't know who!" (id. §§ 407-408, at 123).
142. See E. KELLER, supra note 48, at 169-71, 175-76.
143. Feminists are probably more comfortable with the uncertainty than are physicists. See id. at
139-49 (chapter entitled Cognitive Repression in Contemporary Physics).
144. MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 16, at 543. Because feminism emerges from
women themselves, we can largely avoid the old quandary of whether revolutionary consciousness
arises from the masses or must be prompted by a revolutionary elite. See M. BARRETT, WOMEN'S
OPPRESSION TODAY: PROBLEMS IN MARXIST FEMINIST ANALYSIS 88-98 (1980); V. LENIN, WHAT
Is To BE DONE?, 29-53 (1969 ed.). That is not to say that the women's movement has not suffered
from elitism. It has, but not due to a theoretical failure; feminism is not plagued with a theory that is
"acontextual". See MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 16, at 527 n.23.
145. J.L. Austin has explained the relationship between certainty and confidence in memories and
past discernment. In many situations, "knowing" consists in seeing or sensing some feature or features
which we are sure are similar to something noted and named before in our experience. "But, this that
we see, or otherwise sense, is not necessarily describable in words, still less describable in detail, and
in non-committal words, and by anybody you please." J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 84-85 (3d
ed. 1979) (emphasis in original). Austin stresses the importance of being in a position to know: "[I]f
we have had the necessary experience, then we can, in favorable current circumstances, say we know
. " Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).
146. See MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 16, at 536; MacKinnon, Toward Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 638.
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nism affirms women's point of view by revealing, criticizing, and ex-
plaining its impossibility. This is not a dialectical paradox. It is a
methodological expression of women's situation. . . . Women's situ-
ation offers no outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to,
too much urgency to wait, no place else to go, and nothing to use but
the twisted tools that have been shoved down our throats. If femi-
nism is revolutionary, this is why.14
Consciousness raising is a vivid expression of self-creation and responsi-
bility. To Wittgenstein's insight that perceptions have meaning only in the
context of experience, feminism would add that perceptions have meaning
only in the context of an experience that matters. Consciousness raising
means that dramatic eye-witness testimony is being given; it means, more
importantly, that women now have the confidence to declare it as such.
We have an alternative to relegating our perception to the realm of our
own subjective discomfort. Heretofore, the tried and true scientific strategy
of treating non-conforming evidence as mistaken worked in the legal sys-
tem. But when that evidence keeps turning up, when the experience of
women becomes recalcitrant, it will be time to treat that evidence as
true.
1 48
The foundations of the law will not thereby crumble. Though feminism
rejects the notion that for a legal system to work, there have to be "objec-
tive" rules, we admit that legality has (or should have) certain qualities.
There must be something reliable somewhere, there must be indicia of
fairness in the system, but neither depends on objectivity. Rather, we need
to discard the habit of equating our most noble aspirations with objectivity
and neutrality. We need at least to redefine those terms, and probably to
use others, to meet our very serious responsibilities.
My admission that feminism is result-oriented does not import the re-
nunciation of all standards. In a system defined by constitutional norms
147. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 16, at 637, 639.
148. MacKinnon illustrates with reference to rape. Rape law has assumed that a single, objective
state of affairs existed: A "rape" occurred or it didn't; consent was given or it wasn't. In fact, however,
the reality is often split-"a woman is raped but not by a rapist," id. at 654-and in focusing on the
accused's state of mind, the law concludes that the rape did not happen. The dilemma here involves
more than questions of legal process. Deciding what presumptions should apply then requires a reex-
amination of law's presuppositions about sexuality itself, and then a decision as to what conditions of
sexuality the law should enforce. The choice may come down to one between protecting the likelihood
that men will mistakenly infer consent, on one hand, and encouraging women's access to the world
without fear, on the other. According to MacKinnon,
Whose subjectivity becomes the objectivity of 'what happened' is a matter of social meaning,
that is, it has been a matter of sexual politics. One-sidedly erasing women's violation or dis-
solving the presumptions into the subjectivity of either side are alternatives dictated by the
terms of the object/subject split, respectively. These are alternatives that will only retrace that
split until its terms are confronted as gendered to the ground.
Id.
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such as equality, we need standards to help us make connections among
norms, and to help us see "family resemblances" 149 among instances of
domination. Standards, however, are not means without ends: They never
have and never can be more than working hypotheses.19 0 Just as it would
be shocking to find a case that said, "the petitioner wins though she satis-
fied no criteria," so it must ultimately be wrong to keep finding cases that
say, "petitioner loses though the criteria are indefensible." In legal situa-
tions, a case is either conformed to a standard or the standard is modified
with justification. That justification should not be that "we like the peti-
tioner's facts better;" rather, it is that "on facts such as these, the standard
doesn't hold up."
The feminist approach takes justification seriously; it is a more honest
and efficient way to achieve legitimacy. The feminist legal standard for
equality is altogether principled in requiring commitment to finding the
moral crux of matters before the court. The feminist approach will tax us.
We will be exhausted by bringing feminist method to bear. Yet we must
force law makers and interpreters to hear that which they have been well
trained to ignore. We will have to divest ourselves of our learned reti-
cence, debrief ourselves every day. We will have to trust ourselves to be
able to describe life to each other-in our courts, in our legislatures, in
our emergence together.
149. L. WITTGNSTEIN, supra note 66, § 67, at 32.
150.
No systematic thought has made progress apart from some adequately general working hy-
pothesis, adapted to its special topic. Such an hypothesis directs observation, and decides upon
the mutual relevance of various types of evidence. In short, it prescribes method. To venture
upon productive thought without such an explicit theory is to abandon oneself to the doctrines
derived from one's grandfather.
A. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 286 (1933).
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